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                  Conclusion                                                                  10

                  Judicial Politics in Polarized Times                                        11
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                    n public political discourse, denunciations of activist judges often come   14
                  Iacross as shrill and uninformed, but these arguments dovetail with a long-   15
                  standing strain of scholarly commentary insisting that rights- protecting   16
                  judicial decisions are incompatible with democratic governance. In mod-     17
                  ern constitutional scholarship, this tradition traces its roots to Alexander   18
                  Bickel’s 1962 observation that judicial review is a “deviant institution in   19
                  the American democracy” (1986 [1962], 18). Bickel ultimately concluded      20
                  that judicial review was, in some circumstances, democratically defensi-    21
                  ble, but more recently, Jeremy Waldron has objected that “rights- based     22
                  judicial review is inappropriate for reasonably democratic societies whose   23
                  main problem is not that their legislative institutions are dysfunctional but   24
                  that their members disagree about rights.” In Waldron’s view, “[o]rdinary   25
                  legislative procedures” allow democratic citizens to resolve conflicts over   26
                  rights “in a responsible and deliberative fashion.” As such, “an additional   27
                  layer of final review by courts adds little to the process except a rather   28
                  insulting form of disenfranchisement and a legalistic obfuscation of the    29
                  moral issues at stake in our disagreements about rights” (2006, 1406). In   30
                  the United States, he complains, “the people or their representatives in    31
                  state and federal legislatures can address . . . questions [of rights] if they   32
                  like, but they have no certainty that their decisions will prevail. If some-  33
                  one who disagrees with the legislative resolution decides to bring the mat-  34
                  ter before a court, the view that finally prevails will be that of the judges”   35
                  (2006, 1350).                                                               36
                     In sharp contrast, an altogether different body of scholarly literature   37
                  has contended that exercises of judicial review are often popular and       38
                  rarely final. Keith Whittington and others have long argued that judicial   39











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