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                  Are Judges Sideshows?                                                       10
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                     udges regularly describe themselves as neutral legal umpires but some-   13
                  Jtimes describe their colleagues as unaccountable tyrants. Partisan offi-   14
                  cials echo both stories, depending on whether they are describing allied    15
                  or opposing judges. Scholars often tell a third story, in which judges are   16
                  neither to be praised nor feared. Indeed, on this scholarly account, much   17
                  of the political conflict over judicial decisions is a waste of time. Because   18
                  the vast majority of such decisions are consistent with the public will, they   19
                  ordinarily do not make much difference. We have no reason to fear that      20
                  judges are arbitrarily imposing their own preferences on the country, but   21
                  neither should we expect them to heroically defend constitutional prin-     22
                  ciples against hostile democratic majorities. The lesson of a wide range of   23
                  scholarly literature on courts in the United States (and elsewhere) is that   24
                  judges will rarely try to do either of these things, and that when they do   25
                  try, they will rarely succeed.                                              26
                     Much of this literature can be traced to an influential 1957 article by   27
                  Robert Dahl, which contended that the Supreme Court almost never            28
                  challenges policies supported by the national governing coalition. After    29
                  all, the justices themselves are usually members of that coalition and thus   30
                  share its key priorities. Dahl emphasized that the Court had only rarely    31
                  invalidated federal statutes and that when it had done so, the statutes     32
                  themselves were usually either outdated or trivial; in other words, the     33
                  invalidated laws almost never reflected important priorities of the then-   34
                  governing coalition. Building on Dahl’s seminal account, Howard Gillman     35
                  (2002, 2006), Mark Graber (1993), Michael Klarman (2004), Terri Peretti     36
                  (1999), and Keith Whittington (2007) have argued that most exercises        37
                  of judicial review— even those that appear countermajoritarian at first     38
                  glance— are consistent with the preferences of the governing coalition,     39











 UCP_Fischel_FM.indd              18                                         Achorn International                          05/21/2009  02:08PM  UCP_Fischel_FM.indd              19                                         Achorn International                          05/21/2009  02:08PM
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